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In Federalist 51, James Madison explained the American political system’s primary           
mechanism to prevent one branch of government from absorbing the powers and authorities of              
another. He wrote, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man,               
must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.” In other words, the members of                1
each branch of government need to have a strong interest in protecting their constitutional              
prerogatives. If all three branches of government jealously protect their power, then they will              
inevitably counter each other and the proper balance between them will be maintained. As a               
matter of pure theory, Madison’s argument here makes perfect sense. However, American            
political history has not been kind to Madison’s faith in institutional ambition, at least in the                
sense that he meant it. Clearly, members remain ambitious by some standards. Average             
congressional terms are longer than ever and interpretations of Congress’ policy making power             
under Article One have grown considerably broader. Still, contemporary Congresses have been            2
less willing to take ownership of their legislative duties. Authorities that were traditionally in              
Congress’s domain, such as the war power and various forms of oversight power, have been               
claimed by the executive branch and Congress has done little to fight back. Moreover, modern               
congressional acquiescence presents a serious challenge to Madison’s theory, and this paper            
seeks to explain this through a broad historical study of congressional decline. 
I will begin by analyzing Madison’s ​Federalist essays on the separation of powers as well               
as the Anti-Federalist criticisms of his theory, and then discuss Tocqueville’s concerns about             
1 ​James Madison, "No. 51," in ​The Federalist​ (New York, NY: Barnes & Noble Books, 2006), ​288. 
2 ​Ernie Siepel, "Hey Congress: Keep Your Day Job," NPR, December 28, 2010, 
https://www.npr.org/2010/12/28/132294306/hey-congress-dont-keep-your-day-jobs. 
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centralization and the nature of democratic citizenship. Furthermore, I will also address modern             
explanations for the legislature’s decline with a particular focus on work that deals with              
polarization. Finally, by detailing the weakening of Congress throughout American history with            
an emphasis on twentieth century politics, I will argue that the informal breakdown of              
constitutional norms, along the weakness of modern citizenship and partisan polarization, have            
rendered Madison’s ambition theory ineffective.  
Madison’s Theory of Separated Powers 
One of the primary criticisms of the proposed government’s structure following the            
Constitutional Convention of 1787 was that it allowed the separate branches of government to              
mix excessively. Many feared that this would lead to the consolidation of federal power, and               3
eventually despotic rule. For example, prominent Anti-Federalist George Mason argued that the            
new Constitution “mixed too much the Legislative and Executive,” and that this would             
eventually result in one dominating the other. This concern was a staple in Anti-Federalist              4
rhetoric throughout the convention and during ratification debates. Madison’s best theoretical           5
responses to these arguments can be found in Federalist 47 through 51, where he addressed the                
separation of powers concept explicitly and articulated his theory of institutional behavior based             
on man’s tendency towards self interested “ambition.”  6
In these essays, Madison is quick to endorse the idea “that the legislative, executive, and               
judiciary departments, ought to be separate and distinct.” He points to Montesquieu’s theory of              7
3 ​James Madison, "No. 47," in ​The Federalist​ (New York, NY: Barnes & Noble Books, 2006), 268. 
4 ​George Mason, "Opposition to the Constitution," ed. Ralph Ketchum, in ​The Anti-Federalist Papers​ (New York, 
NY: Signet Classics, 1986), 166. 
5 ​Mason, 166-171 and Madison, 268. 
6 ​James Madison, "No. 51," in ​The Federalist​ (New York, NY: Barnes & Noble Books, 2006), ​288. 
7 ​Madison, 268. 
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government as justification for this concept, and makes clear that he is sympathetic to the               
sentiment being expressed by critics of the proposed Constitution. Still, he pointed out that their               
assessments of the document were flawed. Madison wrote that, in terms of explicit grants of               
authority, the ability of each branch to interfere with the affairs of the others was limited to                 
checking excesses and preventing arbitrary action. In other words, no branch could perform the              
duties of another on its own accord. Congress could not initiate executive action, the Supreme               8
Court could enforce no law, and the President could not legislate. Furthermore, each of the state                
constitutions allowed for a degree of collaboration between the separate branches, and many of              
them permitted far more than the proposed federal Constitution did. 
All of this being said, Madison made clear that these mere “parchment barriers,” no              
matter how strong, were not enough to prevent one branch of government from absorbing the               
powers of another over time. His solution to this problem, as mentioned in the introduction, was                9
to rely on the members of each branch to be devoted enough to the power and legitimacy of their                   
institution to use their ample constitutional authorities to defend against usurpation. The efforts             
of Congressmen and Senators to maximize their own power would actually ensure a proper              
distribution of authority within the federal government. This is the “ambition must be made to               
counteract ambition” concept. Ironically, Madison was far more concerned about the legislative            10
branch becoming the dominant force in American government, particularly at the expense of the              
executive. He argued that in a republican system of government with no monarch, the possibility               
of “legislative usurpation” should be the primary concern. This is of course hard to reconcile               11
8 Madison, 270. 
9 James Madison, "No. 48," in ​The Federalist​ (New York, NY: Barnes & Noble Books, 2006), ​ 275. 
10 Madison, 288. 
11 ​Madison, 276. 
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with the contemporary state of American government, where Congress has been more than             
willing to cede its power to the President and to bureaucratic agencies in the executive branch.                
Given the obvious tension between Madison’s theory and Congress’s gradual decline in power, a              
number of scholars and writers have sought to tackle the question of whether or not Madison’s                
understanding of institutional ambition as a defense against consolidation still has, or ever did              
have, merit as a way to understand interbranch relations. Furthermore, discerning the answer to              
this question is a crucial part of understanding the future of American government, and more               
specifically Congress’s ability to fulfill its constitutional role going forward. 
Critiques of Madison’s Theory: Past and Present  
An early, but poignant, criticism of Madison’s theory can be found in the Anti-Federalist              
essays of Centinel, which were probably authored by Samuel Bryan of Pennsylvania. While             12
Centinel’s work actually predates the publication of the ​Federalist​, it still provides a clear              
counterargument to the political theory of Federalist 51. Centinel’s essay was actually written in              
response to John Adams, who had published an article arguing in favor of a prototypical version                
of Madison’s ambition theory. Moreover, Centinel’s arguments foreshadow future criticisms of           13
Madisonian political thought and demonstrate skepticism towards the virtue of self-interest in            
republican government. Centinel’s key assertion was that a government with three branches and             
considerable authority could not be reasonably expected to direct “ambition...to the prejudice of             
the public good.” Centinel thought that it was beyond the capacity of fallible human beings to                14
balance authority between the three branches well enough so that one branch would not become               
12 James R. Rogers, "Centinel's Criticism of Checks and Balances," ​Law and Liberty​, December 4, 2018. 
13 ​Samuel Bryan, "‘Centinel,’ Number 1," in ​The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention 
Debates​, ed. Ralph Ketchum (New York, NY: Signet Classics, 1986), 235. 
14 Bryan, 235. 
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too powerful at the expense of the others. If Madison’s assumption that public officials will be                
intensely self interested is correct, then Centinel’s concern here becomes even more relevant.   15
Moreover, even if the Framers were able to create a perfect balance between each branch,               
Centinel argued that this would be insufficient to prevent the consolidation of federal power on               
its own. A public willing to maintain a watchful eye over the government would also be                
necessary, and the “views and interests” of each branch would have to be diverse enough to                
prevent “a coalition of any two of them for the destruction of the third.” While nothing like this                  16
has exactly happened, partisan coalitions between members of Congress and the president have             
prevented Congress from defending its institutional interests on numerous occasions.          17
Furthermore, it is not controversial to assert that the American public has been a fairly               
unattentive watchdog in the modern era. Centinel would likely blame this failure of citizenship,              18
at least in part, on the complexity of the federal system. He argued that the Constitution’s                
structural intention to pit ambition against ambition makes it harder for citizens to determine              
exactly who is responsible for the government’s failings, and thus harder for them to hold certain                
actors accountable. In theory, this would leave the door open for one part of the federal                19
government to aggrandize itself far more easily.  
To bring this work into the context of modern congressional weakness, Centinel’s            
arguments have some merit as well as some shortcomings. Throughout American history, the             
way that certain provisions of the Constitution have been interpreted has changed considerably.             
15 ​Bryan, 235-236. 
16 ​Bryan, 235. 
17 ​Margaret Taylor, "Declaring an Emergency to Build a Border Wall: The Statutory Arguments," ​LawFare​, January 
7, 2019. 
18 ​Ilya Somin, "The Problem of Political Ignorance," ​The Regulatory Review​, February 3, 2014. 
19 ​Bryan, 236. 
5 
 
 
 
While congressional authority under the Commerce Clause and the Elastic Clause has expanded,             
so has presidential power under Article Two. While drafting a constitution that balances             
authority between the branches properly is hard enough on its own, as Centinel points out, it                
becomes impossible when interpretations of this authority are constantly changing.          20
Furthermore, this is a big part of why the informal changes that took place in American                
government during the early 20th century resulted in the legislature’s subordination to the             
executive branch. Madison’s implicit checks were unable to prevent this, and Centinel’s work             
goes far in explaining why.  
That said, Centinel seems to overestimate the ability of the citizenry to limit the              
government. In the essay, Centinel is trying to persuade the public not to support a more                21
powerful central government in pursuit of economic well being. At the same time, he is arguing                
that the public is capable of keeping one branch of government from infringing on the authority                
of the others. These things do not seem to fit together. Encouraging institutional competition              22
among elites in government is quite obviously not foolproof. Still, it is more likely to resist the                 
consolidation of federal power than a public that is more concerned with the substance of               
government action than with the process by which it occurs. Public demand for federal              
intervention into economic affairs provided Congress with a strong incentive to delegate power             
to regulatory agencies throughout the 20th century, and it seems that Centinel’s more democratic              
model likely would have expedited this process. 
20 ​Bryan, 235. 
21 ​Bryan, 237. 
22 ​Bryan, 236-37. 
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Another early observer of American politics, Alexis de Tocqueville, shared a number of             
Centinel’s concerns. However, because Tocqueville intended to be an observer, unlike Centinel,            
who was an advocate, Tocqueville’s arguments are more nuanced. Moreover, Tocqueville also            
had the advantage of writing several decades after the Constitution was ratified, which meant he               
had far more to work with in assessing how American government actually functioned. While              
never addressing Madison’s theory directly, Tocqueville seemed to take issue with Madison’s            
view of ambition in republican societies. Tocqueville argued that, in monarchies and            23
aristocracies, there is a natural urge among members of the ruling class to pursue glory and                
power. In self-governing societies, however, he asserted that this sentiment is far less common,              24
especially long term. While this certainly comes with considerable benefits, for example            25
peaceful transitions of power, it also presents a problem for Madison’s theory. Tocqueville             
argues that as conditions become more equal and government becomes more democratic, “lofty             
ambition” tends to die out. If this is correct, then it means that the bedrock of separated powers                  26
in American government is founded on a fleeting sentiment. Tocqueville indicates that whatever             
ambition does remain in the public becomes geared towards physical gratification and economic             
prosperity, and concern over republican principles tend to take a backseat.   27
Furthermore, Tocqueville’s view of democratic ambition ties in directly with his concerns            
about centralization and democratic citizenship. Tocqueville wrote that “the intellect of           
democratic nations is peculiarly open to simple and general notions...its favorite conception is             
23 ​Alexis De Tocqueville, ​Democracy in America​, trans. Henry Reeve (New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2003), 615. 
24 ​Tocqueville, 615-618. 
25 ​Tocqueville, 615-618. 
26 ​Tocqueville, 615. 
27 ​Tocqueville, 618-620. 
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that of a great nation...governed by a single power.” This appears to be a symptom of the sort of                   28
narrow and individualistic ambition that Tocqueville accurately attributes to democratic          
societies. If this is true, then a self-governing nation will tend to centralize its politics at every                 
level possible despite the existence of constitutional guardrails, or as Madison would call them,              
“parchment barriers.” Essentially, this means the consolidation of federal authority. Moreover,           29
with the President being the only nationally elected official in the federal government, it makes               
sense that the democratic push for simplicity would empower the executive branch at the              
expense of others. Furthermore, Tocqueville’s understanding of ambition goes far in explaining            
the unraveling of Madison’s theory in the early 20th century, and is crucial to consider when                
looking at congressional decline in that era. 
While most modern approaches to the question of congressional weakness have had more             
to do with the structure of government and institutional behavior, a few others have sought to                
analyze Madison’s assumptions about self interest and ambition to explain this phenomenon, and             
these are most relevant to this project. For example, in Jeffrey Becker’s ​Ambition in America, he                
takes a critical look at Federalist 51 in the context of modern citizenship and makes               
Tocquevillian arguments. Becker argues that if the public is willing to meaningfully engage             30
with politics, then this “ambition strengthens both the formal institutions of government, as well              
as the reciprocal relationships at the heart of democratic politics.” This is important, as the               31
legislative branch is generally regarded as the most democratic of the three, and the House of                
28 Tocqueville, 661​. 
29 ​Madison, 275. 
30 ​Jeffrey A. Becker, ​Ambition in America: Political Power and the Collapse of Citizenship​.  
(University Press of Kentucky, 2014), 39-59.  
31 Becker, 40. 
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Representatives as the most democratic institution. Because of this, the character of Congress is              
reflective of the public, at least to some extent. According to Becker’s logic, if the citizenry is                 
ambitious, then the sort of ambition that Madison thought vital will likely be exemplified by               
members of Congress and his system, which is reliant on competing interests, could work.              
However, if citizens become unengaged and uninterested in all public affairs aside from             
elections, then Congress takes on this character as well. This leaves a power vacuum between the                
branches that inevitably gets filled. This is essentially Tocqueville’s argument, Becker simply            
has more historical evidence to support it.   32
Much like Centinel, moreover, Becker voices concern over the role of self-interested            
ambition in republican government. This becomes magnified when the amount of ambition            33
between branches or institutions is unequal. Again, if the citizenry becomes careless about the              
actual workings of politics, as Tocqueville feared they would and many scholars would argue              
they have, then the kind of republican ambition that Madison envisioned is likely to take on a                 
much different form. While the Framers were under no impression that self-interested            
individuals with a will to power would not exist, they assumed that enough of them would be                 
around to counter each other. An inattentive public combined with a lack of ambitious public               
officials leaves only the “parchment barriers” that Madison himself admitted were insufficient.            34
Furthermore, while Becker’s work does not focus specifically on the decline of Congress at the               
expense of the executive branch, it gives significant insight into the reasons why this has               
32 ​Becker, 39-59. 
33 Becker, 54. 
34 Madison, 275. 
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happened and largely aligns with the criticisms of Madison forwarded by Tocqueville and             
Centinel.  
Scholarship on Congressional Decline, Executive Growth, and Administrative Control 
A number of contemporary scholars have sought to explain congressional weakness as a             
consequence of member behavior rather than as a result of theoretical flaws in the institution’s               
design. While few of these works directly reference Madison’s ambition theory, they still go far               
in explaining its flaws as they have materialized throughout American history. For example,             
political scientist Yuval Levin succinctly argues that “Congress is weak because its members             
want it to be.” While the increasing power of the presidency and the bureaucracy are often cited                 35
as reasons for the recession of congressional influence, Levin points out that Congress began to               
empower the executive branch on its own accord early in the twentieth century. Therefore,              36
Congress has not been the victim of executive power, but rather an architect of it. According to                 
Levin, modern members of Congress have been just as complicit in their institution’s steady              
decline, despite the frequent partisan complaints of a few members. While more geared towards              37
a general audience, his work is useful for understanding the broad pattern of institutional decline               
within Congress. 
Other scholars, for example Norman Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann, have attributed the             
House and Senate’s “decline in institutional identity” and both institutions’ general “resistance”            
to meaningful reform as crucial factors contributing to congressional decline in the modern era.              38
35 ​Yuval Levin, "Congress Is Weak Because Its Members Want It to Be Weak,” ​Commentary​, June 2018, 1. 
36 Levin, 1. 
37 Levin, 1. 
38 ​Thomas E. Mann, and Norman J. Ornstein, ​The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing  
America and How to Get It Back on Track​, (Oxford University Press, 2006), 54. 
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For example, members of the House of Representatives have traditionally had an almost jealous              
pride in their institution because it is considered to be the lower house, and less prestigious than                 
the Senate. No matter how frivolous this may seem on the surface, Ornstein and Mann point out                 39
that this was a critical component of the House’s will to protect its institutional powers. While                40
their approach differs, Ornstein and Mann’s argument is similar to Becker and Tocqueville’s. If              
the public provides Congress with no incentive to display institutional pride or strength, then              
they will not. 
Some more recent literature attributes congressional dysfunction to the increase of elite            
polarization along party lines. Kathryn Pearson writes that in contemporary politics, “the two             
parties have grown increasingly competitive and polarized.” This assertion is supported by a             41
plethora of evidence, and a considerable amount of research has been performed in an effort to                
explain it. While not all of this research is relevant here, it is an unavoidable fact that                 42
polarization has had significant consequences for the ability of Congress to perform its             
constitutional functions and express institutional ambition. If members of Congress concern           
themselves primarily with partisan divisions, then they will be less capable of uniting to defend               
their institutional interests when necessary. This results in a warped incentive structure, where             43
delegating power to the President or the bureaucracy can be more fitting with the ambitions of                
individual members of Congress than pursuing policy objectives through the legislative process.           
39 Mann and Ornstein, 141. 
40 Mann and Ornstein, 141. 
41 ​Kathryn Pearson, "The Constitution and Congressional Leadership," In ​Is Congress  
Broken?: The Virtues and Defects of Partisanship, Polarization, and Gridlock​, (Washington, D.C.:Brookings 
Institution Press, 2017), 152. 
42 ​Seth J. Hill and Chris Tausanovitch, "A Disconnect in Representation? Comparison of Trends in Congressional 
and Public Polarization," ​The Journal of Politics​ 77, no. 4 (2015), 1058.  
43 ​Sean M. Theriault, ​Party Polarization in Congress​ (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 7-8. 
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For example, a recent congressional effort to reclaim the war power fell flat because a number                 44
of Republican members were unwilling to prioritize their branch over their party.  45
Furthermore, while polarization can certainly explain some of the issues with modern            
Congress, the history of congressional decline goes back much further than the partisan divide of               
recent decades. For example, legal scholar Cass Sunstein writes about Congress’s delegation of             
legislative power to the administrative state during the 1930’s when government was entirely             
unified. While this was a time of economic crisis, Congress still willingly gave up its authority                46
over various areas of policy. Furthermore, as Louis Fisher points out, Congress also began to               
abdicate its role in the war-making process and foreign policy in the early 1950s, when President                
Truman went to war in Korea without approval or consequences. Again, there were no notable               47
polarizing forces in Congress that caused this inaction, members just did not want to cross the                
President. Therefore, while concerns over the impact on increased partisan polarization are            
entirely legitimate, they do not fully explain Congress’s initial willingness to delegate away its              
constitutional authority.  
Some writers have pointed to the expanding domain of the judiciary, particularly since             
the 1960’s, as a culprit in the decline of Congress. For example, Raoul Berger wrote in 1977 that                  
the Supreme Court, and especially the Warren Court, had stretched out the meaning of the               
Fourteenth Amendment so far as to assume legislative power for itself. Mark Tushnet, another              48
legal scholar, makes similar arguments in his criticisms of the modern Court, asserting that the               
44 ​Gillian E. Metzger,  "Agencies, Polarization, and The States," ​Columbia Law​ ​Review​ 115, no. 7 (2015), 1739.  
45 ​Erich Beech, "Trump Vetoes Congressional Resolution to End U.S. Involvement in Yemen War," ​Reuters​, April 
16, 2019. 
46 ​Cass R.Sunstein, "Constitutionalism After the New Deal," ​Harvard Law Review​ (1987), 421. 
47 Louis Fisher,  ​Presidential War Power,​ (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013), 80. 
48 Raoul Berger, ​Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment​, 2nd ed. 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1977), 18. 
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growth of judicial review throughout the twentieth century weakened congressional legitimacy.           49
More recently, political scientist Amanda Hollis-Brusky argues that the Courts have assumed a             
much stronger role in the policymaking process in recent years, and that this exercise of               
quasi-legislative authority inevitably results in a weaker Congress. As Eugene Hickock points            50
out, however, this is largely the fault of Congress, as they have plenty of constitutional authority                
to bend the Court to its will. This was intentional in the design of the judiciary, and                 51
contemporaries of the Framers were far more concerned that the Court would be abused by the                
legislature. However, Congress has not demonstrated the political will to exercise these powers             52
and, absent of consequence, the Court has naturally become more active in certain policy areas.               
Hollis-Brusky writes that, “individuals and organized interest groups are increasingly looking to            
the judicial branch to carry out their policy agendas.” While it is true that the modern Supreme                 53
Court has played a significant role in shaping policy debates, for example those regarding              
abortion and campaign finance, Congress has done little to assert its institutional authority to              
resist these decisions. Therefore, while the increasing influence of the Supreme Court in             
policymaking is a consequence of congressional decline, it is not a legitimate cause of it. 
Literature about the increase of executive power is also important to consider in this              
context, as this increase has come at the expense of Congress. This work often looks at the                 
drastic changes that took place in government as a result of the Industrial Revolution, but also                
49 ​Mark Tushnet, ​Taking the Constitution Away From the Courts​, ( Princeton University Press, 2000), 7. 
50 ​ Amanda Hollis-Brusky,. "An Activist’s Court: Political Polarization and the Roberts Court," In ​Parchment 
Barriers: Political Polarization and the Limits of Constitutional Order​, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 2018), 81. 
51 ​Eugene Hickock,. "Congress, the Court, and the Constitution: Has Congress Abdicated Its Constitutional 
Responsibilities?" ​Heritage Foundation Report​, November 29, 1990, 1.  
52 ​Alexander Hamilton, "No. 78," In ​The Federalist​, 427-35, ( New York, NY: Barnes & Noble Books, 2006), 427.  
53 ​Hollis-Brusky, 87. 
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because of shifts in global politics and American demographics during the early twentieth             
century. The need for these changes were encouraged early on, in 1885 to be exact, by political                 
scientist and future President Woodrow Wilson. In his famous book ​Congressional Government​,            
Wilson was highly critical of a rigid understanding of separated powers and voiced admiration              
for the British Parliament which was based on party, rather than committee, and was led by the                 
Prime Minister, a figure with executive power. Wilson was also supportive of European models              54
of the administrative state and believed such systems were necessary to meeting public needs at               
the turn of the century. He carried these views into his presidency, and his emphasis on                55
executive leadership in policymaking and a strong bureaucracy had a lasting impact on American              
government that will be examined further in the analysis section of this paper.  
Furthermore, there is a growing body of modern literature on executive power that builds              
on the foundation of Wilsonian political thought and that is particularly worth examining in the               
context of congressional weakness, as this work is crucial to determining the relevance of              
Madison’s institutional design in contemporary politics. Dino Christenson and Douglas Kriner           
sum up the recent scholarship on the relationship between the president and Congress well when               
they write that “the legislature appears institutionally all but powerless to stop” presidential and              
bureaucratic action. This is, of course, despite the legislature’s dominant legal powers. The             56
primary issue is, again, that the necessary institutional ambition does not exist, according to              
Christenson and Kriner. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s ​The Executive Unbound: After the             
54 ​Woodrow Wilson, ​Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics​, (Boston, Houghton, 1885), 242. 
55 ​Ronald J. Pestritto, “The Progressive Origins of The Administrative State: Wilson, Goodnow, and Landis,” ​Social 
Philosophy and Policy​ 24, no. 1 (2007), 16. 
56 ​Dino P. Christensen and Douglas L. Kriner, "Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual? The Factors Shaping 
Public Support for Unilateral Action," ​American Journal of Political Science​ 61, no. 2 (2017), 335. 
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Madisonian Republic also casts serious doubt on the sustainability of Madison’s vision and gives              
insight into the Progressive political thinking that brought about a weaker Congress. Posner and              57
Vermeule’s embracement of government by a president-led administrative state is Wilsonian to            
its core, and also confirms the fears of political thinkers like Tocqueville. Christopher DeMuth              
provides a counter-argument to the case by Posner and Vermeule, however he recognizes that              
Congress has become weak for many of the same reasons they cite. Because of this consensus                58
on the trend of executive supremacy at the expense of Congress, both works are important to                
reference. 
Theory 
The evidence that Congress has gotten progressively weaker over the last century is             
overwhelming and obvious, and a scholarly consensus on this issue clearly exists. Furthermore, a              
number of the factors addressed by political scientists and historians play some role in modern               
Congress’s failure to perform its constitutional duties. The work of Pearson, Metzger, and             
Theriault provides important insight into the nature of polarization in Congress, and their             
theories are helpful for understanding Congress’s failure to prevent executive overreach during            
both the Obama and Trump presidencies. Posner, Vermeule, and DeMuth’s emphasis on the             59
early Progressive era as a key period for congressional decline is also significant, as is Sunstein’s                
analysis of the birth of the administrative state during the New Deal.   60
57 ​Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, ​The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic​, (Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 3-4. 
58 ​Christopher DeMuth, "Can the Administrative State be Tamed?," ​Journal of Legal Analysis​ 8, no. 1 (2016), 121. 
59 ​Pearson, 152. Metzger, 7-8. Theriault, 8. 
60 ​Posner and Vermeule, 3-4. 
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Moreover, it seems that the key to understanding the root of congressional decline, and              
thus the failure of Madison’s ambition theory, lies not in an analysis of the institution’s current                
rules and procedures. Rather, the answer appears to lie in understanding the political response to               
several transformative events that have taken place throughout American history and which gave             
birth to these rules and procedures. These include the Industrial Revolution and the Great              
Depression, as both fundamentally altered the expectations and demands of the public. The             
changes that took place as a result of both of these events significantly lowered the incentive for                 
members of Congress to express ambition in the sense that Madison and the Framers intended               
them to. Madison’s theory of institutional ambition was always flawed in some ways, as              
Tocqueville aptly demonstrated, and reliant on certain political circumstances to function           
properly. That said, a detailed study of Congress and interbranch relations until the early              
twentieth century provides some support for the merits of Madison’s theory. What has rendered              
Madison’s theory obsolete in contemporary politics has been the combination of informal and             
formal changes that were made to the Constitution starting in the Progressive era and that               
continue into the present day. 
Another factor worth mentioning with regards to congressional decline is the growing            
allegiance to party over institution in contemporary politics and the role that partisan polarization              
plays in stifling institutional pride and ambition. For example, if a Republican President takes              
unilateral action that is a usurpation of legislative authority, a Republican Congress is unlikely to               
do anything about it because of both partisan loyalty and individual members’ primary interest in               
reelection. The growth of the administrative state in the 20th century and the legislative              61
61 Levin, 1. 
16 
 
 
 
gridlock that has come as a result of polarization means that the bureaucracy is now the primary                 
mechanism through which public policy is made. In fact, it is now common for legislators to                
lobby executive agencies rather than draft and introduce bills in their respective institutions.             62
This is dangerous, and clearly demonstrates that the sort of ambition that Madison anticipated in               
public officials has been warped, and this is now preventing the federal government from              
functioning according to its constitutional mandate. The analysis section of this paper will take a               
historical and developmental approach to make these arguments. I will start with briefly             
analyzing the behavior of early Congresses in the late 18th and early 19th centuries with a                
particular focus on the differences in the representative-constituent relationship that were present            
during that era, and how this influences Congress's’ ability to express ambition. Then, I will look                
at the legislative decline and the growth of the executive branch that came as a result several                 
transformative events that took place during first half of the 20th century. Through the lens of                
Federalist 51, I will contend that the political responses to these events and problems with               
modern citizenship form the basis for current congressional weakness. Finally, I will conclude             
with a reflection on partisan polarization in Congress and the future of Madisonian government. 
The Early Madisonian Congress 
In order to properly explain and analyze the decline of Congress, it is necessary to first                
look at how the legislative branch functioned in the decades following the Constitution’s             
ratification. As noted in the literature review, most observers of American politics at the time               
were far more concerned with the possibility of legislative tyranny, and executive overreach was              
62 Levin, 1. 
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something of an afterthought. This was likely a reflection of the Articles of Confederation’s              63
unreasonable emphasis on legislative supremacy, as well as public concern over the number of              
elite figures who would inhabit Congress. Furthermore, it was widely understood that the             
legislative branch possessed the exclusive ability to make law, and thus had significant control              
over what the new federal government could actually do.  
Some of the most significant figures in early American politics, for example Thomas             
Jefferson and John Adams, recognized Congress as a sort of “natural aristocracy.” Almost all of               64
its members were wealthy, learned elites who carried enormous influence within their home             
states and districts. While this might appear as a meaningless product of a less democratic era on                 
its face, Pasley points out that this meant Congressmen, and especially Senators, had little              
incentive to pander to their constituencies. This inevitably changes the behavior of individual             65
members, and thus the nature of the institution itself. Because there were fewer meaningful              
electoral reasons for members to shirk responsibility or delegate authority than there are now, the               
sort of ambition that Madison sought to channel was far more prevalent within the institution.               
Despite the lower house’s inherently democratic character, election to the House of            
Representatives did not mean that members were expected to simply act as a microphone for the                
preferences of their constituents. Rather, as Madison indicated in Federalist 57, they were             66
expected to use their presumed wisdom “to pursue the common good of society” and to maintain                
constitutional boundaries. If they failed to do so, then they could of course still be held                67
63 ​Judith A. Best, "Legislative Tyranny and the Liberation of the Executive: A View from the Founding." 
Presidential Studies Quarterly​ 17, no. 4 (1987), 697-709.  
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accountable on election day. However, as Pasley points out, Congressmen of this era were far               
less concerned with the day to day and week to week responses of constituents, which in turn                 
allowed members to focus on institutional strength. While Senators were nominated by state             68
legislatures at the time, and therefore had an obligation to represent state interests, their longer               
terms provided them with plenty of insulation to defend the institutional interests of their              
chamber. Furthermore, although all members of Congress were elected directly or indirectly and             
subject to democratic constraints, these were relatively weak.  
An important consequence of this more distant representative-constituent relationship         
was that the sort of ambition that Tocqueville recognized in aristocratic nations could be, at least                
to an extent, exemplified in Congress. A clear ruling elite existed in American politics and many                
of its members were in Congress. Moreover, while Congress could not do as much policy-wise               
as it can now, it took far greater ownership of the duties and prerogatives it did possess. The two                   
most clear examples of this can be seen in Congress’s handling of “its war and spending powers”                 
throughout the late 18th and 19th centuries. Substantive control over both of these areas              69
belongs to the executive branch in contemporary politics, however, it was not always this way.               
As Fisher notes, until the 20th century, every single American military engagement was             
authorized by Congress either by formal declaration or by statute. Even in the face of ambitious                70
presidents like Jefferson and Polk, Congress took full ownership of its war powers and, as a                
result, was able to successfully defend them. Furthermore, Congress handled its spending            
authority in a similar fashion. Keeping “the power of the purse” lodged in the legislature was a                 
68 ​Pasley, 40. 
69 ​Louis Fisher, ​Congressional Abdication on War and Spending Power​ (College Station, TX: Texas A&M 
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crucial part of the Framers’ design and also provided Congress with a powerful tool to defend its                 
institutional interests against the executive branch whenever necessary. Early Congresses          71
recognized this, and defended their authority over taxing and spending against executive efforts             
at usurpation throughout the 19th century. While modern Congress still has a great deal of               72
control over spending, it exercises nowhere near the amount of control over the budget that               
earlier Congresses did and much of this authority has been delegated to the president.              73
Furthermore, these two areas provide clear examples of early congressional strength and modern             
congressional decline. 
The Decline of Legislative Strength 
To preface this section, it is necessary to point out that there were plenty of examples of                 
executive overreach that Congress either ignored, supported, or was unable to stop prior to the               
20th century. For example, Jefferson agreed to spend a large sum of money on the Louisiana                
territory without congressional approval, Andrew Jackson was a notoriously strong president           
who was called “King Andrew” by his political opponents, and Lincoln’s aggressive unilateral             
actions during the Civil War were well-documented. The reason that this section is rooted in the                
early 20th century rather than any of these periods is that it was not until then that American                  
government began to make the lasting and fundamental changes that have left the federal system               
in its contemporary, executive-dominated form. 
As mentioned earlier, the Industrial Revolution brought about a number of changes in             
American society that significantly altered the way many citizens thought about the state and its               
71 Fisher, 24. 
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role in their daily lives. The skepticism of powerful, centralized government which had animated              
American political thought since before the Declaration of Independence was replaced by            
concerns born out of more modern trends. These included the growth of cities, the decline of                
American agriculture, increases in immigration, and the new labor situation that came as a result               
of industrialization. The political manifestation of this sentiment took its form in the early              74
Progressive movement. As Pestritto points out, Progressives emphasized efficiency,         
responsiveness, and “expertise” over the values of deliberation, restraint, and institutional           
competition that informed the political thought of Madison and the Framers and that are reflected               
in the Constitution. According to the Progressive movement’s intellectual leaders, for example            75
Woodrow Wilson and John Dewey, classical republican values had become antiquated and a             
system based on them could not properly serve its citizens. In his lengthy tract on comparative                
government, ​The State​, Wilson argued that modern government should be a tool to help citizens               
actively pursue personal well-being. This was a shift from the traditional liberal view that the               76
fundamental purpose of government was to secure liberties that predated the state, and therefore              
the Progressive vision would require meaningful changes in the structure of the American system              
to be executed.  
Progressive ideas naturally appealed to a number of people who were threatened by the               
economic and cultural changes brought on by the Industrial Revolution. As a result, numerous              
Progressives were lifted into positions of influence. Politically, strains of Progressive ideology            
ran through both major parties by the early 20th century. For example, Republican President              
74 ​Ronald Pestritto, "The Birth of the Administrative State: Where It Came From and What It Means for Limited 
Government," ​Heritage Foundation Policy Analysis​, November 20, 2007. 
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Teddy Roosevelt worked extensively to enact reforms that increased the federal government’s            
role in economic activity. Although Roosevelt was succeeded by fellow Republican William            
Howard Taft, Taft was far more mild in his Progressive crusading and generally stuck to               
Antitrust enforcement. President Taft’s modest approach to the presidency resulted in a 1912             77
challenge from Roosevelt, who was discontent with Taft’s first term. After failing to recapture              
the Republican nomination, Roosevelt started a third party, which was called the Progressive             
“Bull Moose” party. Roosevelt’s efforts resulted in a split between Progressive Republicans,            78
who flocked to the third party, and traditional Republicans, who stuck with Taft. This allowed               
Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic candidate, to ascend to the White House on a platform even               
more fundamentally Progressive than Roosevelt’s. 
Furthermore, in the 20 years from 1901 to 1921, presidents from both major parties who               
were decidedly Progressive governed during 16 of them. While the presidencies of both             
Roosevelt and Wilson more or less contributed to the weakening of the legislature, it remains               
true that Congress, which was also heavily influenced by the Progressive wave, was willing to               
cede its own authority during this era and did so on numerous occasions. 
Many policies favored by Progressives, most of which involved heavy federal regulation            
of economic activity, could not be feasibly enacted by Congress itself. For one, extensive              79
regulatory activity by Congress would be extremely time consuming and require a level of              
specific policy knowledge that most members simply did not possess. Therefore, the execution             
of Progressive policy preferences at the federal level all but required Congress to delegate some               
77 ​Peri E. Arnold, ​Remaking the Presidency: Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, 1901-1916​ (Topeka, KS: University Press 
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authority to administrative agencies and the president. There were numerous pieces of legislation             
passed by Congress during this era that either formed new administrative agencies or gave              
existing ones more policymaking authority. For example, the Interstate Commerce Commission,           
or ICC, was established in 1887 during the early stages of the Progressive movement. In 1906,                80
Congress passed the Hepburn Act, which strengthened the ICC considerably by giving it the              
ability to fix railroad rates. Four years later, the Mann-Elkins Act was enacted. This gave the                81
ICC the authority to regulate other public accomodations in a similar fashion to railroads.              82
Again, this is significant because this is not Congress assuming expansive powers for itself, but               
rather delegating its explicit constitutional ability to “regulate Commerce...among the several           
states” to a bureaucratic regulatory agency. While such a move could be considered ambitious              83
in the sense that it expanded federal authority, it comes into direct conflict with Madison’s               
explanation of institutional ambition in Federalist 51 and fits better with Tocqueville’s            
understanding of the concept and its relationship with centralization. 
Although a reasonable argument can be made that legislation like the Hepburn Act and              
Mann-Elkins Act were a necessary response to the economic situation brought about by the              
Industrial Revolution, this abdication of legislative duty was constitutionally questionable, to put            
it mildly, and continues to have serious ramifications for current American politics. Moreover, if              
Congress would have expressed ambition in the Madisonian sense during this era, then it would               
have attempted to exercise as much control over policy as possible. Instead, it gave control to a                 
80 ​Scott Mall, "Flashback: The Story Behind the Once Mighty Interstate Commerce Commission," ​FreightWaves​, 
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regulatory agency. Congress took similar action with the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act,             
which established the FTC and provided it with considerable authority over the regulation of big               
business and consumer products. Like the Hepburn and Manns-Elkins legislation, this was a             84
significant example of congressional abdication. 
Furthermore, it would a crime to discuss the impact of the early Progressive movement              
on the institutional nature of Congress without at least touching on the 17th Amendment to the                
Constitution. Ratified in 1913, the 17th Amendment took the authority to elect Senators away              
from state legislatures and required popular elections for the Senate in each state. This massive               
shift in electoral incentives naturally influences the behavior of Senators, and recent scholarship             
has confirmed this. For example, Bernhard and Sala found that Senators became far more              
concerned with reelection following the amendment’s ratification and that this resulted in a             
measurable difference in Senate voting patterns, especially close to election day. Furthermore,            85
the work of Crook and Hibbing produced similar results, as they argue that the 17th Amendment                
essentially transformed the Senate in a smaller version of the House of Representatives. This              86
dilutes the Senate’s ability to play its intended, deliberative role and thus prevents Senators from               
properly expressing the sort of ambition that Madison thought necessary to preserving the right              
balance of authority between the three branches.   87
The political success of the Progressives during this era resulted not in the overhaul of the                
Madisonian Constitution, but rather the bastardization of it. With the exception of the 17th              
84 ​Pestritto, 1. 
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Amendment, the fundamental structure of the Constitution had been left untouched. Still, the             
operation of American government had changed significantly in practice. This had serious            
ramifications for Congress’s will and ability to defend Article One prerogatives, and this became              
even more apparent throughout the rest of 20th century.  
Public distaste with the Wilson presidency and U.S. involvement in World War I proved              
to be the undoing of the Progressive era. Republican Warren G. Harding was elected president in                
1920 promising a “return to normalcy,” and his successor, Calvin Coolidge, is most famous for               
his modest style of governing. While it is true that some of the intense economic restrictions of                 88
the Wilson and Roosevelt years were rolled back during the Harding and Coolidge presidencies,              
no reversion to 19th century norms ever took place. For example, the Harding administration              
strongly supported the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which gave the executive branch the               
formal authority to draft the initial budget. Although Congress did retain final say over the               89
budget, this law still gave the President a major role in what had historically been a strictly                 
legislative matter.   90
Furthermore, while the trends of congressional delegation and executive aggrandizement          
slowed down throughout the 1920s, they certainly did not stop and were reignited as soon as the                 
decade came to a close. The emergence of the Great Depression in 1929 spurred a public demand                 
for government intervention that was far more amplified than the similar sentiment that came out               
of the Industrial Revolution and the Progressive era. Furthermore, Progressive influence was            
88 ​Amity Shales, ​Coolidge​ (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2014), 188. 
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obvious in the construction of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, which Congress began             
enacting at rapid pace after his inauguration in 1933. 
While a lengthy book could be written about the degree to which Congress delegated              
away its authority during the 1930s, I seek here to cover only the aggregate impact and to make                  
an attempt to explain this in the context of Madison’s theory of ambition. Oddly enough, quite a                 
few members of Congress were extremely ambitious in terms of their willingness to engage in               
the technical parts of the legislative process during the early and mid 1930s. While the               
widespread suffering brought about by the depression made some sort of government action             
inevitable and FDR was an active executive by any measure, some of the earlier bills that were                 
part of the New Deal package were the exclusive handiwork of Congress and, to some extent,                
demonstrated legislative strength.   91
Still, a vast majority of the legislation that came out of this period served to do at least                  
one of two things: aggrandize the president or delegate legislative authority to regulatory             
agencies. Most of the economic policies favored by FDR and his Democratic allies in Congress               
involved heavy intervention into market activity. Again, these sorts of policies require far too              
much oversight and expertise to be handled exclusively by Congress at the federal level and the                
public demand for action was too great for the naturally deliberative and slow-moving legislative              
process. Thus, delegation ensued. Congress began creating numerous administrative agencies          92
that had significant control over various policy areas and that could be directed by the president                
with a simple stroke of his pen. These included the Federal Works Agency, the Civilian               
91 ​Patrick J. Maney, "The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Congress, 1933," ​OAH Magazine of History​ 12, no. 4 
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Conservation Corps, and National Recovery Administration, among a plethora of others.           
Although the roots of the modern administrative state were laid in the Progressive era, most               
scholars recognize the New Deal as its formal birth.   93
Initially, the Supreme Court tried to put a stop to the Executive branch’s exercise of               
legislative power. For example, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan and ​A.L.A. Schechter Poultry               
Corp. v. United States, ​the Court struck down executive action under the National Industrial              
Recovery Act, with the majority arguing in ​Schechter that Congress had provided President             
Roosevelt with near “unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or               
advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade and industry,” and that this was              
constitutionally impermissible. The Courts, however, could only prevent the legislature from           94
giving away its authority for so long, and 1935 was the last time the Nondelegation doctrine was                 
employed in a majority opinion. After this, the Court became far less willing to interfere in                95
these types of questions, especially if they involved economic policy. This was due, at least in                
part, to public backlash against the Court, but also to the threat of FDR’s infamous Court                
Packing Scheme. Essentially, Roosevelt wanted Congress to a pass a law that would allow him               96
to load the Court with Justices who shared his ideological views. While there was considerable               
backlash against this and the proposal never became law, the threat was sufficient to thwart the                
legal roadblocks of the Nondelegation doctrine and Substantive Economic Due Process.  97
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To bring this back into the context of Madison’s Federalist 51, there are a few important                
things to point out. Members of Congress during this era could be called ambitious in the sense                 
that they assumed a broad swath of power under provisions of the Constitution that had               
previously been interpreted far more modestly, namely the Commerce Clause and the Elastic             
Clause. In pursuit of this kind of ambition, however, Congress failed to defend its institutional               
prerogatives and ultimately subordinated itself to a powerful executive branch that the members             
had designed themselves through years of legislation that expanded both the powers of the              
presidency and the size of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, when Congress did eventually attempt             
to push back against President Roosevelt in the late 1930s, the legislature found its ability to do                 
so hampered. They could certainly stifle the White House’s formal legislative efforts, but they              98
could not effectively slow down the president’s capacity to use the administrative state to his               
benefit. In other words, Congress had created a quasi-branch of government outside of the              99
Madisonian design, and the implicit restraints of the Madisonian system did not neatly apply to               
it.  
To be clear, the ​problems of limited expertise and efficiency that fueled congressional             
delegation during the Progressive era were multiplied by the complexities of the Great             
Depression. The oncoming of World War II added to this significantly, and national security              
concerns resulted in even more power being shifted to the executive branch. It is important to                100
reemphasize that during national emergencies before the Great Depression and World War II, the              
president had assumed great powers before. As mentioned in the introduction to this section,              
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President Lincoln took a number of sweeping unilateral actions to direct the Union during the               
Civil War, among these the suspension of Habeas Corpus and reinstating the draft. Still, after               101
the war had ended, Congress retained its position as the dominant branch. No such thing               
happened after World War II. A fundamental transformation had taken place in American             102
Politics, and the president was the primary benefactor. This was not only because of the large                
bureaucracy that was now at the disposal of the executive, but also because a dramatic shift in                 
public attitudes had occurred. While it had been trending this way in the years prior, after the                 
attack on Pearl Harbor it was clear that “the presidency was in, and Congress was out.”   103
Although both President Roosevelt and Congress enjoyed similarly high approval rates           
during Roosevelt’s first two terms, Maney points out that congressional popularity began to             
decline significantly following the outbreak of war. This only added to the other ambition              104
inhibiting obstacles that Congress had created through its statutory delegation of authority to the              
executive branch. While congressional popularity has varied since then, it is consistently low in              
contemporary politics and is useful to explaining the institution’s inability to properly defend             
itself now. This also fits with Tocqueville’s predictions regarding centralization. As he pointed             105
out numerous times, democratic citizens care primarily about their own economic self-interest            
and, over time, tend to push political authority towards a single institution. The public nature               106
of FDR’s presidency, combined with the circumstances of war and economic struggle, made             
strong executive leadership alluring. Aside from the difficulties it had created for itself through              
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New Deal legislation, Congress also had little incentive to attempt to reclaim its former strength,               
as the public had accepted the legislature as a political actor subordinate to the president.  107
Furthermore, this trend continued past Word War II, and the lack of institutional ambition              
in modern Congress has never been more clear than it was in 1953, when President Truman                
unilaterally committed troops to Korea without consequence. As discussed in earlier sections, the             
authority to declare war had always belonged to and been exercised by Congress rather              
uncontroversially. However, Truman was able to assume this power for himself with little             108
meaningful pushback and every president since has exercised the war power similarly.            109
Although there have always been a few members of Congress who at least pay lip service to the                  
idea that this is an example of executive overreach whenever it happens, no effective action has                
been taken to curb presidential war powers. The institutional will to reclaim this authority in               110
any meaningful way simply does not exist, as this would require an assumption of great               
responsibility by members of Congress that would likely complicate electoral goals. On top of              
this, there is little public interest in this issue and most of the debate over it is left to                   
constitutional scholars and lawyers. This speaks to Tocqueville’s concerns about ambition and            
democratic citizenship. When a political issue comes across as abstract or distant, an             111
unengaged public will tend to ignore it even if it is of vital significance. As Becker would argue,                  
this results in a Congress that mimics this attitude, especially as the aristocratic elements of the                
institution decay. As a result, control is consolidated in the branch with the most ambitious               112
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actors, which in this case has been the executive. Furthermore, the war powers issue perfectly               
exemplifies the current relationship between the president and Congress and how it has             
developed since the middle of the 20th century.  
Although there was some effort to push back against the abuse of presidential war powers               
and presidential supremacy more generally around the time of the Watergate Scandal in the              
1970s, this effort was fleeting and ineffectual in the long-term. The War Powers Resolution of               
1973 was passed over President Nixon’s veto, however if anything it made executive war powers               
more formidable by statutorily legitimizing presidential claims that he could move first in             
committing troops without prior legislative approval. Recent presidents, including Obama and           113
Trump, have even been able to get away with ignoring the limited requirements of the War                
Powers Resolution altogether.   114
If Madison’s theory of ambition were to function properly in any of these examples, then               
Congress would have used any number of the considerable tools granted to it in Article One of                 
the Constitution to prevent its subordination to the president as an institution. Clearly, however,              
it has not done so. Throughout both the transformative Progressive and New Deal eras, Congress               
sought to expand the scope of its actual policy authority to respond to new complexities in                
American social and economic life. This effort required both policy expertise and a willingness              
to micromanage, and Congress possessed neither. This, combined with Progressive hostility           
towards key facets of the Madisonian system and the public desire for immediate action, led to                
the rise of the administrative state and serious increases in presidential power.  
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Initially, a strong argument could be made that congressional delegation was fueled by             
ambition. Congress sought to gain control over areas of policy that previously belonged to state               
governments throughout the Progressive and New Deal eras, and it did so successfully. Still, this               
was not the sort of ambition that Madison’s theory relies on, which involves keeping              
constitutional authorities “in their proper places.” If Congress had exhibited Madisonian           115
ambition, it would have shouldered as much of the burden as possible, or at least delegated                
power to actors that it could easily control. This, however, is not what happened. As more actual                 
legislative authority has been given away and incentive structures have changed, members of             
Congress continue to lack the sort of institutional pride that once played an important stabilizing               
role in early interbranch relations and that Madison had great faith in. Furthermore, the long-term               
consequence of this has been a weak and ineffectual Congress in the 21st century and the rise of                  
increasingly ambitious executives. 
The State of Modern Congress and Conclusion 
While these problems with Congress stemming out of the 20th century have continued in              
contemporary politics, the more recent trend of intense partisan polarization is worth discussing             
in terms of legislative decline. As I touched on briefly in the literature review, a number of                 
scholars have identified polarization as a barrier that Congress has been unable to overcome in               
its efforts to counter presidential power. For example, if a president takes constitutionally             
problematic unilateral action, it is very unlikely that his partisan allies in Congress would be               
willing to stand it against it so long as it goes with their policy preferences. Because the modern                  
president is also undoubtedly the leader of his party, partisan members of Congress might see               
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their electoral fate as being inexorably tied to the president. This provides a powerful incentive               116
to fall in line, especially for members of the party establishment.  
The congressional response to President Trump’s recent emergency declaration         
concerning border security provides a perfect example of this. After a lengthy government             
shutdown in which the White House failed to sway the Democrat controlled House of              
Representatives to provide it with 5.7 billion dollars to begin construction on a wall along the                
U.S.-Mexico, Trump decided to claim this money unilaterally from funds that were allocated to              
the Pentagon. Despite this being an emergency declaration, Trump seemed to downplay this             117
part of it, stating that he “didn’t need to do this” and that he “just wanted to get it done faster.”                     118
In other words, the president found himself frustrated with the legislative process, and decided to               
circumvent it. While some Republican members of Congress expressed concerns about the            
constitutionality of Trump’s declaration and a bill that would have overturned it passed through              
both the House and Senate, Trump was able to use his veto power knowing that Congress lacked                 
the will to override it and prevent the usurpation of its legislative authority. Similar events               119
took place during Obama’s presidency when he issued Executive Orders that essentially rewrote             
immigration law, however on that occasion it was Democrats in Congress who were unwilling to               
cross the president.   120
If Madison’s theory of ambition was still relevant in contemporary politics, it is hard to               
imagine that either of these things could have happened. A crucial part of the ambition theory is                 
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the stipulation that ​“the interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of                
the place.” In other words, allegiance to institution or branch must outweigh allegiance to party               121
in order for the separation of powers to be truly secure. Modern polarization, especially as it                
exists in Congress, significantly undermines this. Particularly in the 21st century, most            
congressional efforts to curb presidential power and reclaim legislative authority have been            
fueled by partisan animus rather than by genuine concern over the weakness of their own               
institutions. As a result, all that is left to prevent the concentration of political power in the                 
executive branch and the administrative state are the “parchment barriers” that Madison himself             
argued were insufficient.  122
While Madison’s theory was always fragile, it proved effective for a long period of time.               
It’s true undoing only came about when Congress sought to modernize and expand its reach               
through delegation. Congressional expressions of institutional ambition in the early 20th century            
took the shape of interpreting Article One extremely broadly and then passing the ability to make                
policy under this expanded definition to some other actor in the federal government. In a perfect                
Madisonian world, members of Congress would have assumed as much responsibility as possible             
so that they could maximize their power within constitutional limits. Although the            
aforementioned complexities that came along with the Industrial Revolution and the New Deal             
were admittedly significant, this does not act as a justification for Congress’s steady abdication              
of its constitutional responsibilities. As the 19th century Congresses demonstrated, power can            
naturally ebb and flow between the executive and legislative branches depending on the political              
situation, however Congress must be capable of assuming its rightful place in the Madisonian              
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system after times of crisis or rapid change are over. Contemporary Congresses have been unable               
to do this, and as a result the administrative state remains a powerful policymaking agent and                
presidents can get away with murder when it comes to unilateral action.  
In order to understand the current state of separated powers, it is more helpful to look                
through the lens of Tocqueville than Madison. The sort of elite ambition that Madison assumed               
would keep one branch of government from usurping the authority of the others is nowhere to be                 
found, however the trends of centralization and weak citizenship that Tocqueville foresaw are             
overwhelming in current American politics. There is no indication that either of these things will               
change anytime soon, and it seems safe to say that Madison’s theory of ambition is no longer a                  
useful way to understand interbranch relations. It would be extremely healthy for the Republic if               
Congress were able to demonstrate a degree of institutional ambition and take back control over               
things like the war power and commercial regulation. However, the lack of widespread public              
concern over this and the informal changes to the American Constitution stemming out of the               
Progressive era and the New Deal make it likely that members of Congress will continue               
expressing their ambition electorally, and nowhere else.  
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